CONTRACT 3541 Settlement Agreement3541 • . . .
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
This SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ( "Agreement ") is made and entered into
as of October 18, 2005, by and between RODGER YEATON and LINDA
POLLARD as trustees of the YEATON AND POLLARD TRUST (referred to
herein as "Plaintiff'), on the one hand, and the CITY OF EL SEGUNDO, a
California municipal corporation and SEIMONE JURJIS (collectively the "City "),
on the other hand, in order to settle plaintiff's claims against the City in that action
entitled RODGER YEATON AND LINDA POLLARD as trustees of the YEATON
and POLLARD TRUST v. CITY OF EL SEGUNDO, SEIMONE JURJIS, in his
official capacity as Building Official of the City of El Segundo; (Los Angeles
Superior Court Case No. BS096531) (the "Action ").
RECITALS
A. Plaintiff owns property in the City of El Segundo located at 916 Sheldon
Street ( "the Property "). In August 2004 Plaintiff received building permits for two
units on the Property; a front unit and a second unit, as that term is defined in
Government Code §65852.2. Plaintiff filed the Action against the City on or about
April 25, 2005 seeking an order mandating the City to acknowledge the validity of
the building permits and to allow construction of the units in accordance with the
plans.
B. After the submission of evidence and argument, on September 23,
2005, Superior Court Judge Dzintra Janays ruled that the permits were valid
because: (1) the City of El Segundo was estopped to deny the validity of the
building permits to construct the units on the Property; and (2) that former El
Segundo Municipal Code §20.20.020(J), entitled Permitted Uses, was invalid, as
it related to locational requirements for second dwelling units. Judge Janays also
ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to damages as compensation for lost rents and
stated that current El Segundo Municipal Code §15 -1 -6, defining "second
dwelling unit," and Chapter 15 -4, entitled "Second Dwelling Units," areis valid.
Judge Janays ordered additional briefing on the issue of the amount of such
compensation. Judge Janays scheduled a further hearing to resolve the issue of
damages on November 7, 2005.
C. Plaintiff and the City have each expressed willingness to enter into a
settlement agreement which resolves all disputes alleged in the Action and avoid
further litigation between the parties.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and of the mutual
promises and covenants hereinafter set forth, it is hereby agreed by and among
the parties hereto that all claims, contentions, allegations, causes of action and
demands which are specifically alleged in or which arise from the matters alleged
in the Action are to be compromised and settled, without any admission of liability
or concession by any party that the contentions of the other party are correct, on
the following terms:
1. Plaintiff's Obligations.
A. The windows on the current structures shall be the only windows
permitted on the structures and shall remain in their current location except the
window on the south side of the front unit located towards the rear property line
shall be removed and replaced with a window that is 2' wide by 5' tall and moved
to the center of the wall, approximately 10" from the ceiling. The window on the
north side of the rear unit shall be made of opaque material such as leaded
decorative glass but shall be openable.
B. Plaintiff shall not object to any variance to raise the fence between the
Property and the southern neighbor, which may be sought by the property owner
to the south, so long as such fence does not exceed 3 feet in height from the
existing height and such fence meets all current building and safety standards.
C. Provided that Plaintiff is provided with access for construction, Plaintiff
shall construct a 6' high block wall, measured from grade on Plaintiff's Property,
from the existing wooden /steel fence located on the north side property line of the
rear portion of his property along the northerly property line to the beginning of
the front yard setback line.
D. Plaintiff, its successors and assigns, shall refrain from challenging the
validity of current El Segundo Municipal Code §15 -1 -6, defining "second dwelling
unit," and Chapter 15 -4, entitled "Second Dwelling Units."
2. City's Obligations.
A. From and after the date of execution of this Agreement, the City shall
not interfere with the construction of either unit on the Property consistent with the
previously approved building permit nos. 501 -04 and 502 -04 and related
construction permits, except as modified by this Agreement. There is no
requirement to underground the electrical, phone and cable service to the
Property and the City waives imposition of any such requirements.
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B. Concurrently with the execution of this Agreement, the City shall pay
Plaintiff $6,000 to contribute toward the cost of construction associated with the
obligations described in paragraphs 1. A. and C.
C. The City shall waive all permit fees associated with the construction of
the 6' high block wall to be constructed by plaintiff on the northerly property line,
as set forth in paragraph 1.C., above.
D. The City waives all rights to appeal the judgement entered pursuant to
this Agreement.
3. No constraint on future exercise of police powers. No part of
this Agreement shall serve to constrain the discretion of the City with respect to
any future applications for development.
4. Stipulated judgment.
A. The parties shall cooperate to present to the court a stipulated
judgment consistent with the terms of this Agreement. Such Stipulated Judgment
is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
B. Judge Janays' failure to sign the stipulated judgment in the form
attached hereto, or at all, shall not impact the effectiveness of this settlement
agreement.
5. Mutual Release. Effective upon execution of this Agreement,
the parties shall forever release, discharge and acquit each other from any and all
sums of money, claims, contentions, allegations, demands, accounts, actions and
causes of action whatsoever heretofore arising or now existing by virtue of any
matter, fact, transaction or occurrence whatsoever, whether known or unknown,
suspected or unsuspected, relating specifically to the matters referred to in the
Action. Without any limitation on the foregoing, the parties specifically waive all
claims to attorney's fees and costs and damages associated with the Action or
matters referred to therein.
It is understood and agreed that the release shall extend to all claims of
every nature and kind whatsoever, known or unknown, addressed in the Action,
and all rights under Section 1542 of the California Civil Code are hereby
expressly waived. Said section reads as follows:
"A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor
does not know or suspect to exist in his favor at the time of executing the
release, which if known by him must have materially affected his settlement
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with the debtor."
6. No Liability. It is understood and agreed that this settlement is
the compromise of disputed claims, and that the terms and conditions recited
herein above are not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the
parties hereby released, and that said parties deny liability therefor and intend
merely to avoid litigation.
7. Entire Agreement. It is understood and agreed that no
promise, inducement or agreement not herein expressed has been made to the
parties hereto, and that this Agreement contains the entire agreement between
the parties hereto with reference solely to the matters herein addressed and not
to any other matters. This Agreement may be modified only by a writing signed
by all of the parties hereto.
8. Advice of Counsel. The advice of legal counsel has been
obtained by the parties prior to the execution of this Agreement. All parties
hereby execute this settlement and release voluntarily with full knowledge of its
significance, and with the express intention of effecting the extinguishment of any
and all obligations and claims arising out of or in any way connected with the
matters addressed.
9. Attorneys' Fees. In the event of any litigation to enforce this
agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees as
determined by the Court.
10. Interpretation. The Agreement is deemed to have been
prepared by all of the parties hereto, and any uncertainty or ambiguity herein
shall not be interpreted against the drafter, but rather, if such ambiguity or
uncertainty exists, shall be interpreted according to the applicable rules of
interpretation of contracts without regard to which party drafted it.
11. Authority. The persons so signing this Agreement hereby
warrant that they have full authority to sign this Agreement on behalf of the
respective parties.
12. Costs. Each of the parties shall bear its own costs and
attorneys' fees in connection with the Action, and the negotiation, execution and
implementation of this Agreement.
13. Waiver. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be
effective, or shall be deemed to have occurred by implication or operation of law,
unless such waiver is made in writing, is signed by a duly authorized
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representative of the party against whom enforcement of the waiver is sought,
and refers expressly to this paragraph. No waiver of any right or remedy in
respect to any individual occurrence or event shall be deemed a waiver of any
right or remedy in respect to any separate occurrence or event. The exercise of
any remedy provided in this Agreement shall not be a waiver of any consistent
remedy provided by law, and the provisions of this Agreement for any remedy
shall not exclude any other consistent remedies unless they are expressly
excluded.
14. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which, taken
together, shall constitute one and the same instrument.
15. Binding on Successors. This Agreement shall be binding
upon and shall inure to the benefit of successors of the parties.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Agreement to be
executed by each of them and /or by their respective and duly authorized
representatives on the date set forth below.
Dated: October 25, 2005
City of El Segundo
ATTEST: By
i
Dated: October 25, 2005 ROGER YEATON and LINDA
POLLARD as trustees of the
YEATON AND POLLARD TRUST
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:
UT
Peter L. Wallin
WALLIN, KRESS, REISMAN & KRANITZ
attorneys for ROGER YEATON and
LINDA POLLARD as trustees of the
YEATON AND POLLARD TRUST
L
354 1 . , , `!
M k D. Hensley
City Attorney, City of El Segundo
JENKINS & HOGIN, LLP
attorneys for City
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EXHIBIT "A"
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MARK D. HENSLEY (SBN 142653)
Ci Attorney, City of El Segundo
CHMSTI HOGIN (SBN 138649)
JOHN C. COTTI (SBN 193139), and
JENKINS & HOG,1N, LLP
Manhattan Towers
1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 110
Manhattan Beach, California 90266
(310) 643 -8448; (310) 643 -8441 (fax)
Attorneys for Defendants CITY OF EL SEGUNDO and
SEIMONE JURJIS
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Exempt from fees per
Government Code § 6103
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
RODGER YEATON and LINDA
POLLARD, as Trustees for the Yeaton and
Pollard Trust,
Petitioners and Plaintiffs,
V.
CITY OF EL SEGUNDO, SEIMONE
JURJIS, in his official capacity as Building
Official of the City of El Segundo and
DOES 1 through 50,
Respondents and Defendants.
Case No. BS096531
Assigned for all purposes to the
Honorable Dzintra janays - Dept. 85
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT- (PROPOSED
dUDGMEW
GRANTING WRIT OF MANDATE
Petition and Complaint Filed: 04/25/05
Respondent CITY OF EL SEGUNDO and Petitioners RODGER YEATON and LINDA
POLLARD hereby represent as follows:
WHEREAS, on April 25, 2005, Petitioners Rodger Yeaton and Linda Pollard, as
Trustees for the Yeaton and Pollard Trust, filed the instant action seeking an order mandating
Respondents City of El Segundo and Seimone Jurjis to honor the validity of building permits to
construct a front unit and a second unit, as that term is defined in Government Code §65852.2,
on property located at 916 Sheldon Street, El Segundo, California (the "Property ") and to allow
construction of the units in accordance with the permitted plans.
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT; (PROPOSED) JUDGMENT
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WHERE,AS, after the submission of evidence and argument, the matter came regularly
for hearing before the Honorable Dzintra Janays on September 23, 2005, in Department 85 of
the Los Angeles Superior Court.
WHEREAS, Judge Janays riled that the building permits to construct the units on the
Property were valid because (1) the City of El Segundo was estopped to deny the validity of
the building permits to construct the units on the Property; and (2) former El Segundo
Municipal Code §20.20.020(J), entitled Permitted Uses, was invalid as it related to locational
requirements for second dwelling units.
WHEREAS, Judge Janays further stated that current El Segundo Municipal Code § 15-
1-6, defining "second dwelling unit, and Chapter 15 -4, entitled "Second Dwelling Units," is
valid.
WHEREAS, Judge Janays further ruled that Petitioners were entitled to damages as
compensation for lost rents. Judge Janays ordered additional briefing on the issue of the
amount of such compensation. Judge Janays scheduled a further hearing to resolve the issue
of damages on November 7, 2005.
WHEREAS, Petitioners and Respondent now wish to resolve the instant dispute.
Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Settlement Agreement.
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT; (PROPOSED] JUDGMENT
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3541.,.,.
WHEREFORE, the Parties stipulate and agree as follows:
1. That Judgment shall be entered by the Court granting the Petition for Writ of
Mandate consistent with this Stipulation for Judgment.
2. The parties shall thlly and completely abide by the terms of this Stipulation for
Judgment and the Settlement Agreement.
3. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys' fees.
DATED: October 18, 2005 MARK D. HENSLEY, City Attorney, and
JENKINS & HOGIN, LLP
& e 1.g'
By: JO C. COTTI,
Att C. for Respondents and Defendants,
CITY OF EL SEGUNDO and SEIMONE
JUR.JIS
DATED: October 18, 2005 WALLIN, KRIjkS, REIS & KRANITZ
By: PETER L. WALLIN
Attorneys for Petitioners
RODGER YEATON and LINDA POLLARD
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT; [PROPOSED) JUDGMENT
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354 1
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
RODGER YEATON and LINDA
POLLARD, as Trustees for the Yeaton and
Pollard Trust,
Petitioners and Plaintiffs,
V.
CITY OF EL SEGUNDO, SEIMONE
JURJIS, in his official capacity as Building
Official of the City of El Segundo and
DOES 1 through 50,
Respondents and Defendants.
Case No. BS096531
(PROPOSED] STIPULATED
JUDGMENT GRANTING WRIT OF
MANDATE
Petition and Complaint Filed: 04/25/05
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §664,6 and on Motion for Entry of Judgment
based upon the Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, and good cause appearing therefore:
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT; [PROPOSED] JUDGMENT
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that:
1. The Petition for Writ of Mandate is granted. The Court finds as follows:
A. The building permits to construct the units on the Property at 916 Sheldon
Street were valid because the City of El Segundo is estopped to deny their validity;
B. The building permits to construct the units on the Property at 916 Sheldon
Street are valid because former El Segundo Municipal Code §20.20.020(J), entitled Permitted
Uses, was invalid as it related to locational requirements for second dwelling units,
C. Current El Segundo Municipal Code §15 -1 -6, defining "second dwelling
unit," and Chapter 15 -4, entitled "Second Dwelling Units," is valid.
2. Petitioners waive any and all claims for damages, except as provided in the
settlement agreement; and
3. Each patty shall bear their own attorneys' fees and costs.
DATED:
zmtra Janays
Judge of the Superior Court
STIPULATXON FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT; (PROPOSER)) JUDGMENT
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Rodger Yeaton, et al. vs. City of El Segundo
LASC Case No.: BS096351
SERVICE, LIST
Peter L. Wallin, Esq.
Lisa E. Kranitz, Esq.
WALLIN, K.RESS, REISMAN & KRANI'TZ
2800 28h Street, Suite 315
Santa Monica, CA 90405
Attorneys for RODGER YEATON and
LINDA POLLARD
Tea: 310.450.9582
Fax: 310.450.0506
10/26/2005 09:49 3106439441 JEWINS & HOGIN LLP PAGE 14
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ROOF OF SERVIC E
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18
and not a party to the within action; my business address is 1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 110,
Manhattan Beach, CA 90266.
On October 26, 2005, I served the foregoing documents described as:
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT; [PROPOSED] STIPULATED
JUDGMENT GRANTING WRIT OF MANDATE
on all interested parties in this action by placing the original thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes
with fully prepaid postage thereon and addressed as follows:
,PLEASE SEE SER P7CE LIST ATTACHED
X BY MAIL. I caused such envelope with postage thereon fully prepared to be placed
in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California.
I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for
mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with
postage thereon prepaid at Manhattan Beach, California in the ordinary course of business. I am
aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or
postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
OVERNIGHT COURIER. I caused such envelope to be transmitted via Overnight
Courier to the offices of the addressee(s).
VIA, FACSIMILE. I caused such document to be transmitted via facsimile to the
offices of the addressee(s).
X STATE I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
California that the above is true and correct.
FEDERAL I declare that I
this Court at w
Executed this 26th day of October 200
in the office of a member of the Bar of
the service is made.
Beach, California.
E. Jones